Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing publicmonitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play.
Introduction
Intertemporal incentives often allow players to achieve payoffs that are inconsistent with myopic incentives. For games with public histories, the construction of sequentially rational equilibria with nontrivial intertemporal incentives is straightforward. Since continuation play in a public strategy profile is a function of public histories only, the requirement that continuation play induced by any public history constitute a Nash equilibrium of the original game is both the natural notion of sequential rationality and relatively easy to check (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) ). These perfect public equilibria (or PPE) use public histories to coordinate continuation play.
While games with private monitoring (where actions and signals are private) have no public histories to coordinate continuation play, some do have histories that are almost public. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play for such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play. To make this precise, we must describe what it means for a game to have "general but almost-public private monitoring" and "essentially."
Since the coordination-of-continuation-play interpretation depends on the structure of the strategy profile, we focus on equilibrium strategy profiles, rather than on the equilibrium payoff set, of private-monitoring games. Very little is known about the general structure of the equilibrium payoff set for general private-monitoring games. We return to this issue at the end of the Introduction.
Fix a game with full support public monitoring (so that every signal arises with strictly positive probability under every action profile). In the minimal perturbation of the publicmonitoring game towards private monitoring, each player observes a private signal drawn from the space of public signals, and the other specifications of the game are unchanged. In this private-monitoring game, at the end of each period, there is a profile of private signals, and we say the game has minimally-private almost-public monitoring if the probability of any profile in which all players observe the same value of the signal is close to the probability of that signal in the public-monitoring game (there is also positive probability that different players observe different values of the public signal).
Any strategy profile of a public-monitoring game naturally induces behavior in minimallyprivate almost-public-monitoring games. 1 Mailath and Morris (2002) introduced a useful representation device for these profiles. Recall that all PPE of a public-monitoring game can be represented in a recursive way by specifying a state space, a transition function mapping public signals and states into new states, and decision rules for the players, specifying behavior in each state (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) ). We use the same state space, transition function and decision rules to summarize behavior in the private-monitoring game. Each player will now have a private state, and the transition function and decision rules define a Markov process on vectors of private states.
This representation is sufficient to describe behavior under the given strategies, but (with private monitoring) is not sufficient to verify that the strategies are optimal. It is also necessary to know how each player's beliefs over the private states of other players evolve. This is at the heart of the question of whether histories can coordinate continuation play, since, given a strategy profile, a player's private state determines that player's continuation play. A sufficient condition for a strict equilibrium to remain an equilibrium with private monitoring is that after every history each player assigns probability uniformly close to one to all other players being in the same private state (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 4.1) ). PPE with bounded recall satisfy this sufficient condition, since for sufficiently close-by games with minimally-private almost-public monitoring, the probability that all players observed the same last L signals can be made arbitrarily close to one. However, under other strategy profiles, the condition may fail. The grim trigger PPE in some parameterizations of the repeated prisoners' dilemma, for example, does not induce an equilibrium in any close-by minimally-private almost-public-monitoring game (Example 2 in Section 3.1).
The restriction to minimally-private almost-public monitoring is substantive, since all players' private signals are drawn from a common signal space. In this paper, we allow for the most general private monitoring consistent with the game being "close-to" a public-monitoring game. We assume there is a signalling function for each player that assigns to each private signal either some value of the public signal or a dummy signal (with the interpretation that that private signal cannot be related to any public signal). Using these signalling functions (one for each player), there is a natural sense in which the private monitoring distribution can be said to be close to the public monitoring distribution, even when the sets of private signals differ, and may have significantly larger cardinality than that of the set of public signals. We say such games have almost-public monitoring. If every private signal is mapped to a public signal, we say the almost-public-monitoring game is strongly close to the public-monitoring game.
Using the signalling functions, any strategy profile of the public-monitoring game induces behavior in strongly-close-by almost-public-monitoring games. As in minimally-private almostpublic-monitoring games, a player's private state determines that player's continuation play.
Given a sequence of private signals for a player, that player's private state is determined by the induced sequence of public signals that are the result of applying his signalling function. Consequently, it might appear that the richness of the private signals does not alter the situation from the case of minimally-private almost-public monitoring. However, the richness of the private signals is important for the formation of that player's beliefs about the other players' private states. It turns out that the requirement that the private-monitoring distribution be close to the public-monitoring distribution places essentially no restriction on the manner in which private signals enter into the formation of posterior beliefs. Nonetheless, if the profile has bounded recall, the richness of the private signals is irrelevant. Indeed, even if the private-monitoring games are not strongly close to the public-monitoring game, there is still a natural sense in which every strict PPE with bounded recall induces equilibrium behavior in every close-by almost-public-monitoring game (Theorem 2).
When a strategy profile of the public-monitoring game does not have bounded recall, realizations of the signal in early periods can have long-run implications for behavior. Subject to some technical caveats, we call such a profile separating. While the properties of bounded recall and separation do not exhaust possible behavior, they do appear to cover most behaviors of interest. 2 When the space of private signals is sufficiently rich in the values of posterior-odds ratios (this is what we mean by "general almost public"), and the profile is separating, it is possible to manipulate a player's updating over other players' private states through an appropriate choice of private history. This suggests that it should be possible to choose a private history with the property that a player (say, player i) is in one private state and assigns arbitrarily high probability to all the other players being in a different common private state.
There is a significant difficulty that needs to be addressed in order to make this argument: The history needs to have the property that player i is very confident of the other players' state transitions for any given initial state. This, of course, requires the monitoring be almost-public. At the same time, monitoring must be sufficiently imprecise that player i, after an appropriate initial segment of the history, assigns positive probability to the other players being in a common state different from i's private state. This is the source of the difficulty: for any T -length history, there is an ε (decreasing in T ) such that for private monitoring ε-close to the public monitoring, player i is sufficiently confident of the period T private states of players j = i as a function of their period t < T private states (and the history). However, this ε puts an upper bound on the prior probability that player i can assign in period t to the players j = i being in a common state different from i's private state. Since the choice of T is decreasing in this prior (i.e., larger T required for smaller priors), there is a tension in the determination of T and ε.
We show, however, that any separating profile implementable using a finite number of states has enough structure that we can choose the history so that not only do relevant states cycle, but that every other state transits under the cycle to a cycling state. The cycle allows us to effectively choose the T above independently of the prior, and gives us our main result (Theorem 4): Separating strict PPE profiles of public-monitoring games implementable using a finite number of states do not induce Nash equilibria in any strongly-close-by games with rich private monitoring.
Thus, separating strict PPE of public-monitoring games are not robust to the introduction of even a minimal amount of private monitoring. Consequently, separating behavior in privatemonitoring games typically cannot coordinate continuation play (Corollary 1). On the other hand, bounded recall profiles are robust to the introduction of private monitoring. The extent to which bounded recall is a substantive restriction on the set of payoffs is unknown. 3 Our results do suggest, even for public-monitoring games, that bounded recall profiles are particularly attractive (since they are robust to the introduction of private monitoring). Moreover, other apparently simple strategy profiles are problematic.
Our focus on equilibrium strategy profiles is in contrast with much of the literature in repeated games with private monitoring. 4 For the repeated prisoners' dilemma with almostperfect private monitoring, folk theorems have been proved using both equilibria with a coordination interpretation (for example, Sekiguchi (1997), which we discuss in Example 1, and Bhaskar and Obara (2002) ) and those that are "belief-free" (for example, Piccione (2002), Ely and Välimäki (2002) , and Matsushima (2004) 5 ). Loosely, belief-free equilibria are constructed so that after relevant histories, players are indifferent between different choices. In games with finite signal spaces, this requires a significant amount of randomization (randomization is not required with a continuum of signals, but only because behavior can be purified using signals). Not only is the generality of this approach unclear (Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005) ), these equilibria do not have a clean coordination interpretation due to the extent of player indifferences.
Finally, we view our findings as underlining the importance of communication in privatemonitoring games as a mechanism to facilitate coordination. For some recent work on communication in private-monitoring games, see Compte (1998) , Kandori and Matsushima (1998) , Levine (2004), and McLean, Obara, and Postlewaite (2002) . 3 Cole and Kocherlakota (forthcming) show that for some parameterizations of the repeated prisoners' dilemma, the restriction to strongly symmetric bounded recall PPE results in a dramatic collapse of the set of equilibrium payoffs.
4 See Kandori (2002) for a brief survey of this literature, as well as the accompanying symposium issue of the Journal of Economic Theory on "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring."
5 Matsushima (2004) covers some two player games with private monitoring that need not be almost perfect, with signals that are either conditionally independent or have a particular correlation structure. His analysis does not cover almost-public-monitoring games.
Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Private-Monitoring Games
The infinitely-repeated game with private monitoring is the infinite repetition of a stage game in which at the end of the period, each player learns only the realized value of a private signal. There are n players, with a finite stage-game action set for player i ∈ N ≡ {1. . . . , n} denoted A i . At the end of each period, each player i observes a private signal, denoted ω i drawn from a finite set Ω i . The signal vector ω ≡ (ω 1 , . . . , ω n ) ∈ Ω ≡ Ω 1 × · · · × Ω n occurs with probability π(ω|a) when the action profile a ∈ A ≡ ∏ i A i is chosen. Player i does not receive any information other than ω i about the behavior of the other players. All players use the same discount factor, δ .
Since ω i is the only signal a player observes about opponents' play, we assume (as usual) that player i's payoff after the realization (ω, a) is given by u * i (ω i , a i ). Stage game payoffs are then given by
It will be convenient to index games by the monitoring technology (Ω, π), fixing the set of players and action sets.
A pure strategy for player i in the private-monitoring game is a function s i : H i → A i , where
is the set of private histories for player i.
Definition 1 A pure strategy is action-free if, for all h
Since action-free strategies play a central role in our analysis, it is useful to note the following immediate result, which does not require full-support monitoring (its proof is omitted):
Lemma 1 Every pure strategy in a private-monitoring game is realization equivalent to an action-free strategy. Every mixed strategy is realization equivalent to a mixture over action-free strategies.
Remark 1 Behavior strategies realization equivalent to a mixed strategy will typically not be action-free. For example, consider the once repeated prisoners' dilemma, with action spaces
and the mixed strategy assigning equal probability to the two actionfree strategiess 1 ands 1 , wherē
6 Interpreting the prisoners' dilemma as a partnership game, e i is "exert effort," while n i is "no effort." A behavior strategy realization equivalent to this mixed strategy must specify in the second period behavior that depends nontrivially on player 1's first period action. (A similar observation applies to public-monitoring games: every pure strategy is realization equivalent to a public strategy, every mixed strategy is realization equivalent to a mixture over public strategies, and yet all behavior strategies that are realization equivalent to a mixed strategy may not be public.) 
, where µ i is a probability distribution over the initial state w 1 i , and W i is countable. Not all mixed strategies can be described in this way, since the set of all pure strategies is uncountable (which would require W i to be uncountable).
Remark 2 A consequence of Remark 1 is that action-free strategy profiles, and profiles of mixtures over action-free strategies, are often not sequentially rational. However, when the monitoring has full support, every Nash equilibrium has a realization-equivalent sequentially rational strategy profile (see Sekiguchi (1997, Proposition 3) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998, p. 648) ). Consequently, we focus on Nash equilibria of games with private monitoring.
Example 1 We will often use the repeated prisoners' dilemma under various monitoring assumptions. The ex ante stage game is given by the normal form in Figure 1 . 7 Much of the literature has studied almost-perfect conditionally-independent private monitoring: player i's signals are given by Ω i = {ê i ,n i }, withâ i ∈ Ω i a signal of a j ∈ A j ≡ e j , n j . Players 1 and 2's signal are, conditional on the action profile, independently distributed, with
where ε > 0 is a small constant. As will be clear, we focus on a different class of private monitoring distributions.
In an important article, Sekiguchi (1997) constructed an efficient equilibrium for the almostperfect conditionally-independent case (as well as for correlated but almost-perfect monitoring). Let W i = {w e , w n }, σ i (w n ,â i ) = w n for allâ i , σ i (w e ,ê i ) = w e , and σ i (w e ,n i ) = w n . The pure strategy of grim trigger (begin playing e i , and continue to play e i as long asê i is observed, switch to n i aftern i and always play n i thereafter) is induced by the initial state w 1 i = w e . The pure strategy of always play n i is induced by the initial state w 1 i = w n . The critical insight in Sekiguchi (1997) is that while grim trigger is not a Nash equilibrium of this game, the symmetric mixed strategy profile where each player independently randomizes over initial states w e and w n is an equilibrium (as long as δ is not too close to 1). Sekiguchi (1997) then constructs an equilibrium for larger δ by treating the game as M distinct games, with the k th game played in periods k + tM, for t ∈ ℵ. The mixed equilibrium for M = 3 is constructed from the machine in Figure 2 . The state w ene for example corresponds to grim trigger in "games" 1 and 3, and always n i in game 2.
Public-Monitoring Games
We turn now to the benchmark public-monitoring game for our games with private monitoring. The finite action set for player i ∈ N is again A i . The public signal is denoted y and is drawn from a finite set Y . The probability that the signal y occurs when the action profile a ∈ A ≡ ∏ i A i is chosen is denoted ρ(y|a). We refer to (Y, ρ) as the public-monitoring distribution. Player i's payoff after the realization (y, a) is given byũ * i (y, a i ). Stage game payoffs are then given bỹ
The infinitely repeated game with public monitoring is the infinite repetition of this stage game in which at the end of the period each player learns only the realized value of the signal y. Players do not receive any other information about the behavior of the other players. All players use the same discount factor, δ .
A strategy for player i is public if, in every period t, it only depends on the public history h t ∈ Y t−1 , and not on i's private history. 8 Henceforth, by the term public profile, we will always mean a strategy profile for the public-monitoring game that is itself public. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a profile of public strategies that, after observing any public history h t , specifies a Nash equilibrium for the repeated game. Under imperfect full-support public monitoring, every public history arises with positive probability, and so every Nash equilibrium in public strategies is a PPE.
Any pure public strategy profile can be described as an automaton as follows: There is a set of states, W , an initial state, w 1 ∈ W , a transition function σ : W ×Y → W , and a collection of decision rules, d i : W → A i . In the first period, player i chooses action a 1 i = d i w 1 . The vector of actions, a 1 , then generates a signal y 1 according to the distribution ρ ·|a 1 . In the second period, player i chooses the action a 2 i = d i w 2 , where w 2 = σ w 1 , y 1 , and so on. Since we can take W to be the set of all histories of the public signal, ∪ k≥0 Y k , W is at most countably infinite. A public profile is finite if W is a finite set. Note that, given a pure strategy profile (and the associated automaton), continuation play after any history is determined by the public state reached by that history. In games with private monitoring, by contrast, given an action-free strategy profile (and the associated automaton), a sufficient statistic for continuation play after any history is the vector of current private states, one for each player.
Denote the vector of average discounted expected values of following the public profile Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) ), that if the profile is an equilibrium, then, for all w ∈ W , the action profile
is a pure strategy equilibrium of the static game with strategy spaces A i and payoffs g i (·; w) for each i and, moreover,
describes an equilibrium of the static game with payoffs g (·; w) for all w ∈ W , then the induced pure strategy profile in the infinitely repeated game with public monitoring is an equilibrium. 9 
is a strict Nash equilibrium of the static game g (· :; w). 10 A maintained assumption throughout our analysis is that public monitoring has full support.
Assumption 1 ρ (y|a) > 0 for all y ∈ Y and all a ∈ A.
, and for every pair of states w,ŵ ∈ W , there exists a sequence of signals
The restriction to minimal automata is without loss of generality: every profile has a minimal representing automaton. Moreover, this automaton is essentially unique. 11 Accordingly, we treat a public strategy profile and its minimal representing automaton interchangeably.
Almost-Public Monitoring
Minimally-private almost-public monitoring
Games with public monitoring (Y, ρ) are nested within games with private monitoring, since public monitoring simply means that all players always observe the same signal, i.e., Ω i = Ω j = Y , and π (y, . . . , y|a) = ρ (y|a) for all a. Mailath and Morris (2002) discussed the case of minimally-private monitoring, in the sense that there is a public monitoring distribution (Y, ρ) with Ω i = Y and π close to ρ:
y ∈ Y and all a ∈ A. We also say that such a private-monitoring game has minimally-private almostpublic monitoring. 9 We have introduced a distinction between W and the set of continuation payoffs for convenience. Any pure strategy equilibrium payoff can be supported by an equilibrium where W ⊂ ℜ I and φ (w) = w (again, see Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) ).
10 Equivalently, a PPE is strict if each player strictly prefers his equilibrium strategy to every other public strategy. For a large class of public-monitoring games, strictness is without loss of generality, in that a folk theorem holds for strict PPE (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994, Theorem 6 .4 and remark)).
11 Suppose (W, w 1 , σ , d) and (W ,w 1 ,σ ,d) are two minimal automata representing the same public strategy profile. Define a mapping ϕ : W →W as follows: Set ϕ(w 1 ) =w 1 . Forŵ ∈ W \{w 1 }, letŷ 1 , . . . ,ŷ be a public history reachingŵ (i.e.,ŵ = σ (ŷ 1 , . . . ,ŷ ; w 1 )), and set ϕ(ŵ) =σ (ŷ 1 , . . . ,ŷ ;w 1 )). Since both automata are minimal and represent the same profile, ϕ does not depend on the choice of public history reachingŵ. It is straightforward to verify that ϕ is one-to-one and onto. Moreover,σ (y,w) = ϕ(σ (y, ϕ −1 (w)), andd(w) = d(ϕ(w)).
In other words, the ex ante stage payoffs of any minimally-private almost-public-monitoring game are close to the ex ante stage payoffs of the benchmark public-monitoring game.
An important implication of the assumption that the public monitoring has full support is that when a player observes a private signal y, (for ε small) that player assigns high probability to all other players also observing the same signal, irrespective of the actions taken. Since the proof is immediate, it is omitted.
Lemma 2 Fix a full support public monitoring distribution ρ and η > 0. There exists ε > 0 such that if π is ε-close to ρ, then for all a ∈ A and y ∈ Y ,
A public strategy profile (W, w 1 , σ , d) in the public-monitoring game induces a strategy profile (s 1 , . . . , s n ) in minimally-private almost-public-monitoring games in the obvious way:
, and defining states recursively by w
This private strategy is, of course, action-free.
If W is finite, each player can be viewed as following a finite state automaton. Hopefully without confusion, when we can take the initial state as given, we abuse notation and write
We describe w t i as player i's private state in period t. It is important to note that while all players are in the same private state in the first period, since the signals are private, after the first period, different players may be in different private states. The private profile is the translation to the private-monitoring game of the public profile (of the publicmonitoring game).
If player i believes that the other players are following a strategy that was induced by a public profile, then a sufficient statistic of h t i for the purposes of evaluating continuation strategies is player i's private state and i's beliefs over the other players' private states, i.e., (w t i , β t i ), where β t i ∈ ∆(W N−1 ). In principle, W may be quite large. For example, if the public strategy profile is nonstationary, it may be necessary to take W to be the set of all histories of the public signal, ∪ k≥0 Y k . On the other hand, the strategy profiles typically studied can be described with a significantly more parsimonious collection of states, often finite. When W is finite, the need to only keep track of each player's private state and that player's beliefs over the other players' private states is a considerable simplification, as the following result (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 4 .2)) demonstrates. 
, and if π is ε-close to ρ, then the private profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game with private monitoring for the same δ and the expected payoff in that equilibrium is within κ of the public equilibrium payoff.
Example 2 We return to the repeated prisoners' dilemma, with ex ante stage game given by Figure 1 (recall footnote 7) . In the benchmark public-monitoring game, the set of public signals is Y = {y,ȳ} and public monitoring distribution is
The grim trigger strategy profile for the public-monitoring game is described by the automaton W = {w e , w n }, initial state w e , decision rules d i (w a ) = a i , and transition rule σ (w, y) = w e , if y =ȳ and w = w e , w n , otherwise.
Grim trigger is a strict PPE if δ > (3p − 2q) −1 > 0 (a condition we maintain throughout this example). We turn now to minimally-private-monitoring games that are ε-close to this publicmonitoring game. It turns out that, for ε small, grim trigger induces a Nash equilibrium in such games if q < r, but not if q > r. Consider first the case q > r and the private history (e 1 y 1 , n 1ȳ1 , n 1ȳ1 , . . . , n 1ȳ1 ). We now argue that, after a sufficiently long such history, the grim trigger specification of n 1 is not optimal. Intuitively, while player 1 has transited to the private state w n 1 , player 1 always puts strictly positive (but perhaps small) probability on his opponent being in private state w e 2 . Since q > r (and ε is small), the private signalȳ 1 after playing n 1 is an indication that player 2 had played e 2 (rather than n 2 ), and so player 1's posterior that player 2 is still in w e 2 increases. Eventually, player 1 is sufficiently confident of player 2 still being in w e 2 that he finds n 1 suboptimal. On the other hand, when q ≤ r, such a history is not problematic because it reinforces 1's belief that 2 is also in w n 2 . Two other histories are worthy of mention: (e 1 y 1 , n 1 y 1 , n 1 y 1 , . . . , n 1 y 1 ) and (e 1ȳ1 , e 1ȳ1 , e 1ȳ1 , . . . , e 1ȳ1 ). Under the first history, while the signal y 1 is now a signal that 2 had chosen e 2 in the previous period, for ε small, 1 is confident that 2 also observed y 2 and so will transit to w n 2 . For the final history, the signalȳ 1 continually reassures 1 that 2 is still playing e 2 , and so e 1 remains optimal. (See Mailath and Morris (2002, Section 3. 3) for the calculations underlying this discussion.) Example 3 As the players become patient, the payoffs from grim trigger converge to (0, 0). A grim trigger profile (i.e., a profile in which the specification of n i is absorbing) can only achieve significant payoffs for patient players by being forgiving. 12 Such a profile provides a different example of how a strict PPE can fail to induce a Nash equilibrium in close-by minimallyprivate-monitoring games. The simplest forgiving profile requires two realizations of y to switch to n 1 n 2 . The automaton for this profile has a set of states W = {w e ,ŵ e , w n }, initial state w e , decision rules d i (w a ) = a i and d i (ŵ e ) = e i , and transition function σ (w, y) =    w e , if y =ȳ and w = w e , w e , if y = y and w = w e or y =ȳ and w =ŵ e , w n , otherwise.
The profile is illustrated in Figure 3 . This PPE never induces a Nash equilibrium in closeby minimally-private-monitoring games: consider a private history in which player 1 plays e 1 and observesȳ 1 for T periods, and then observes y 1 . Under the forgiving profile, player 1 is supposed to switch to the private stateŵ e 1 and continue to play e 1 (until another y 1 is observed). But, for large T , it is more likely that player 2 has observed y 2 in exactly one of the first T periods than having observedȳ 2 in every period. 13 Consequently, for large T , player 1 will not find e 1 optimal. Clearly, the same analysis applies to forgiving grim triggers that require more realizations of y to switch to w n .
Another class of forgiving grim trigger profiles requires successive realizations of y to switch to w n . In the three state version, the automaton is identical to that above except σ (ŵ e ,ȳ) = w e (see Figure 4) . The analysis of this profile is similar to that of Example 2. The profile does not induce a Nash equilibrium in close-by minimally-private-monitoring games if q > r for similar reasons. There are now two possibilities for the case q ≤ r, since isolated observations of y 1 do not lead to w n 2 . For the histories considered in Example 2, the same argument applies once we note that, conditional on players being in one of w e orŵ e , a player assigns very high probability to the other player being in the same state, since this is determined by the last signal. The remaining histories are those with isolated observations of y 1 . The critical history (since it contains the largest fraction of y 1 's consistent with e 1 ) is (e 1ȳ1 , e 1 y 1 , e 1ȳ1 , e 1 y 1 , . . . , e 1ȳ1 ), that is,
, then such a history (weakly) indicates that player 2 is still playing e 2 , while the reverse strict inequality indicates that player 2 is playing n 2 . Summarizing, the profile induces a Nash equilibrium in close-by minimally-private-monitoring games if and only if q ≤ r and
General almost-public monitoring
We now turn to the most general private monitoring structure that nonetheless preserves the essential characteristics of both Definition 3 and Lemma 2. 14 If the private monitoring is ε-close under f , but not strongly ε-close under f , then some private signals are not associated with any public signal: there is a signal ω i satisfying f i (ω i ) = ∅. Such an "uninterpretable" signal may contain no information about the signals observed by the other players.
Definition 4 The private monitoring distribution
(Ω, π) is ε-close under f to the public mon- itoring distribution (Y, ρ), where f = ( f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a vector of signaling functions f i : Ω i → Y ∪ {∅}, if 1. for each a ∈ A and y ∈ Y , π ( {ω : f i (ω i ) = y for all i}| a) − ρ ( y| a) ≤ ε,
for all y
Note that the second condition implies that every player has at least one private signal mapped to each public signal. Moreover, for the case Ω i = Y , the first condition implies the second (Lemma 2).
The condition of ε-closeness in Definition 4 can be restated as follows. Recall from Monderer and Samet (1989) that an event is p-evident if, whenever it is true, everyone assigns probability at least p to it being true. The following Lemma is a straightforward application of the definitions, and so we omit the proof. 
Example 4
We now allow player 1 to have a richer set of private signals, Ω 1 = {y 1 ,ȳ 1 ,ȳ 1 }, keeping player 2 signals unchanged, Ω 2 = {y 2 ,ȳ 2 }. The probability distribution of the signals is given in Figure 5 . This private-monitoring distribution is √ ε-close to the public-monitoring distribution of Example 2 under the signaling functions f i (y i ) = y and f 2 (ȳ 2 ) = f 1 (ȳ 1 ) = f 1 (ȳ 1 ) =ȳ, as long as ε is sufficiently small, relative to min{α , α − α }.
We will also say that such a private-monitoring game has almost-public monitoring.
Figure 5: The probability distribution of the private signals for Example 4. The distribution is given as a function of the action profile a 1 a 2 , where α = p if a 1 a 2 = e 1 e 2 , q if a 1 a 2 = e 1 n 2 or n 1 e 2 , and r if a 1 a 2 = n 1 n 2 (analogously, α is given by p , q , or r as a function of a 1 a 2 ). All probabilities are strictly positive.
As above, the ex ante stage payoffs of any almost-public-monitoring game are close to the ex ante stage payoffs of the benchmark public-monitoring game (the proof is in the Appendix).
Lemma 4 For all
Fix a public profile W, w 1 , σ , d of a full-support public-monitoring game (ũ * , (Y, ρ)), and, under f , a strongly ε-close private-monitoring game (u * , (Ω, π)). The public profile induces a private profile in the private-monitoring game in a natural way: Player i's strategy is described by the automaton (W, w 1 , σ i , d i ) , where σ i (w, ω i ) = σ (w, f i (ω i )) for all ω i ∈ Ω i and w ∈ W . The set of states, initial state, and decision function are from the public profile. The transition function σ i is well-defined, because the signaling functions all map into Y , rather than Y ∪ {∅}. As for games with minimally-private almost-public monitoring, if player i believes that the other players are following a strategy induced by a public profile, a sufficient statistic of h t i for the purposes of evaluating continuation strategies is player i's private state and i's beliefs over the other players' private states, i.e., (w t i , β t i ), where β t i ∈ ∆ W N−1 . Finally, we can recursively calculate the private states of player i as
, and so on. Thus, for any private history h t i , we can write w t i = σ i (h t i ).
Example 5
In Example 2, we argued that if q < r, grim trigger induces Nash equilibrium behavior in close-by minimally-private-monitoring games. We now argue that under the private monitoring distribution of Example 4, even if q < r, grim trigger will not induce a Nash equilibrium behavior in some close-by games. In particular, suppose 0 < r < q < q < r. Under this parameter restriction, the signalȳ 1 after n 1 is indeed a signal that player 2 had also played n 2 . However, the signalȳ 1 after n 1 is a signal that player 2 had played e 2 and so a sufficiently long private history of the form (e 1 y 1 , n 1ȳ 1 , n 1ȳ 1 , . . . , n 1ȳ 1 ) will lead to a posterior for player 1 at which n 1 is not optimal.
PPE with bounded recall
As we saw in Example 5, arbitrary public equilibria need not induce equilibria of almost-publicmonitoring games, because the public state in period t is determined, in principle, by the entire history h t . For profiles that have bounded recall, the entire history is not needed, and equilibria in bounded recall strategies will induce equilibria in almost-public-monitoring games. 
Lemma 5 The public profile induced by the minimal automaton (W, w 1 , σ , d) has bounded recall if and only if there exists L such that, for all t and w, w ∈ W t and for all h
Fix a strict public equilibrium with bounded recall, W, w 1 , σ , d . Fix a private monitoring technology (Ω, π) ε-close under f to (Y, ρ). Following Monderer and Samet (1989), we first consider a constrained game where behavior after "uninterpretable signals" is arbitrarily fixed. Define the set of "uninterpretable" private histories,
. This is the set of private histories for which in any of the last L periods, a private signal ω τ i satisfying f i (ω τ i ) = ∅ is observed. We fix arbitrarily player i's action after any private history h t i ∈ H u i . For any private history that is not uninterpretable, each of the last L observations of the private signal can be associated with a public signal by the function f i . Denote by w i (h t i ) the private state so obtained. That is,
for all h t i / ∈ H u i . We are then left with a game in which in period t ≥ 2 player i only chooses an action after a signal ω t−1 i yields a private history not in H u i . We claim that for ε sufficiently 15 Denote a dummy signal by * . Mailath and Morris (2002) used the term bounded memory for public profiles with the property that there is an integer L such that a representing automaton is give by
. . , y 2 ) for all y ∈ Y , and w 1 = ( * , . . . , * ). Our earlier notion implicitly imposes a time homogeneity condition, since the caveat in Lemma 5 that the two states should be reachable in the same period is missing. The strategy profile in which play alternates between the same two action profiles in odd and even periods has bounded recall, but not bounded memory.
small, the profile (ŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ N ) is an equilibrium of this constrained game, whereŝ i is the strategy for player i: , player i assigns a high probability to player j observing a signal that leads to the same private state. The crucial point is that for ε small, the specification of behavior after signals ω i satisfying f i (ω i ) = ∅ is irrelevant for behavior at signals ω i satisfying f i (ω i ) ∈ Y . It remains to specify optimal behavior after signals ω i satisfying f i (ω i ) = ∅. So, consider a new constrained game where player i is required to followŝ i where possible. This constrained game has an equilibrium, and so by construction, we thus have an equilibrium of the unconstrained game. We have thus proved:
Theorem 2 Fix a full-support public-monitoring game (ũ * , (Y, ρ)) and a strict public perfect equilibrium,s, with bounded recall L. There exists ε > 0 such that for all private-monitoring games (u * , (Ω, π)) ε-close under f to (ũ * , (Y, ρ)),
if f i (Ω i ) = Y for all i, the induced private profile is a Nash equilibrium; and 2. if f i (Ω i ) = Y for some i, there is a Nash equilibrium of the private-monitoring game, s, such that, for all h t = (y 1 , . . . , y t−1 ) and h t
for all j. Moreover, for all κ > 0, ε can be chosen sufficiently small that the expected payoff to each player under s is within κ of their public equilibrium payoff.
We could similarly extend our results on patiently-strict, connected, finite public profiles (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 5 .1)) and on the almost-public almost-perfect folk theorem (Mailath and Morris (2002, Theorem 6 .1)) to this more general notion of nearby privatemonitoring distributions.
Failure of Coordination
Example 5 illustrates that updating in almost-public-monitoring games can be very different than would be expected from the underlying public-monitoring game. In this section, we build on that example to show that when the set of signals is sufficiently rich (in a sense to be defined), many profiles fail to induce equilibrium behavior in almost-public-monitoring games.
Our negative results are based on the following converse to Theorem 1 (the proof is in the Appendix). Since the theorem is negative, the assumption of strong ε-closeness enhances the usefulness of the result. We implicitly used this result in our discussions of the repeated prisoners' dilemma. For example, in Example 5, we argued that there was a private history for player 1 that leaves him in the private state w n 1 , but his posterior after that history assigns probability close to 1 that player 2's private state is w e 2 . Our approach is to ask when it is possible to so "manipulate" a player's beliefs through selection of private history that the hypotheses of Theorem 3 are satisfied. In particular, we are interested in the weakest independent conditions on the private-monitoring distributions and on the strategy profiles that would allow such manipulation.
Fix a PPE of the public-monitoring game and a close-by almost-public-monitoring game. The logic of Example 5 runs as follows: Consider a player i in a private stateŵ who assigns strictly positive (albeit small) probability to all the other players being in some other common private statew =ŵ (full-support private monitoring ensures that such an occurrence arises with positive probability). Letã = (d i (ŵ), d −i (w)) be the action profile that results when i is in statê w and all the other players are in statew. Suppose that if any other player is in a different private state w =w, then the resulting action profile differs fromã. Suppose, moreover, there is a signal y such thatŵ = σ (ŵ, y) andw = σ (w, y), that is, any player in the stateŵ orw observing a private signal consistent with y stays in that private state (and so the profile cannot have bounded recall, see Lemma 5). Suppose finally there is a private signal ω i for player i consistent with y that is more likely to have come fromã than any other action profile, i.e., ω i ∈ f −1 i (y) and (where π i (ω i |a) is the probability that player i observes the signal ω i under a)
16 While we have stated this theorem, and Theorem 4 below, for pure strategies, they also hold for some mixed strategy profiles. Recall from Section 2.1 that given an automaton (W, d i , σ i ) describing a collection of pure strategies for player i (taking any state w ∈ W as the initial state gives a pure strategy), a probability distribution over W gives a mixed strategy. Consider now a mixed strategy PPE of the game with public-monitoring. Clearly, such a profile cannot be strict. However, there may exist a period T , such that all the incentive constraints after period T are strict (the equilibria in Sekiguchi (1997) are important examples). In that case, Theorem 3 holds if the hypotheses are satisfied for t ≥ T .
Then, after observing the private signal ω i , player i's posterior probability that all the other players are inw should increase (this is not immediate, however, since the monitoring is private). Moreover, since players inŵ andw do not change their private states, we can eventually make player i's posterior probability that all the other players are inw as close to one as we like.
, an application of Theorem 3 shows that the induced private profile is not an equilibrium.
The suppositions in the above logic can be weakened in two ways. First, it is not necessary that the same private signal ω i be more likely to have come fromã than any other action profile. It should be enough if for each action profile different fromã, there is a private signal more likely to have come fromã than that profile, as long as the signal not mess up the other inferences too badly. In that case, realizations of the other signals could undo any damage done without negatively impacting on the overall inferences. For example, suppose there are two players, with player 1 the player whose beliefs we are "manipulating," and in addition to statew, player 2 could be in stateŵ or w. Suppose also A 2 = {ã 2 , a 2 , a 2 }. As before, suppose there is a signal y such that w = σ (w, y),ŵ = σ (ŵ, y), andw = σ (w, y) , that is, any player in the state w,ŵ, orw, observing a private signal consistent with y stays in that private state. We would like the odds ratio Pr(w 2 =w|h t 1 )/ Pr(w 2 =w|h t 1 ) to converge to zero as t → ∞, for appropriate private histories.
, and a 2 = d 2 (w), and suppose there are two private signals, ω 1 and ω 1 consistent with y, satisfying
Then, after observing the private signal ω 1 , we have
as desired, but Pr(w 2 = w|h t 1 , ω 1 )/ Pr(w 2 =w|h t 1 , ω 1 ) increased. On the other hand, after observing another private signal ω 1 , also consistent with y, while the odds ratio Pr(w 2 = w|h t 1 , ω 1 )/ Pr(w 2 = w|h t 1 , ω 1 ) falls, Pr(w 2 =ŵ|h t 1 , ω 1 )/ Pr(w 2 =w|h t 1 , ω 1 ) increases. However, it may be that the increases can be offset by appropriate decreases, so that, for example, ω 1 followed by two realizations of ω 1 results in a decrease in both odds ratios. If so, a sufficiently high number of realizations of ω 1 ω 1 ω 1 result in Pr(w 2 =w|h t 1 )/ Pr(w 2 =w|h t 1 ) being close to zero. In terms of the odds ratios, the sequence of signals ω 1 ω 1 ω 1 lowers both odds ratios if, and only if,
Our richness condition on private monitoring distributions captures this idea. For a private monitoring distribution, (Ω, π), It will be useful to quantify the extent to which the conditions of Definition 7 are satisfied. Since the space of signals and actions are finite, there are a finite number of constraints in Definition 7, and so for any rich private monitoring distribution, the set of ζ over which the supremum is taken in the next definition is non-empty. 18
Definition 8 Given f , the richness of a rich private-monitoring distribution (Ω, π) is the supremum of all ζ > 0 satisfying: for all y ∈ Y , the convex hull of the set of vectors {γ
The second weakening concerns the nature of the strategy profile. The logic assumed that there is a signal y such thatŵ = σ (ŵ, y) andw = σ (w, y). If there were only two states,ŵ and w, it would clearly be enough that there be a finite sequence of signals such that bothŵ and w cycle. When there are more states, we also need to worry about what happens to the other states. In addition, we need to allow for time-dependent profiles, and profiles that use some states for only a finite time. Define R(w) as the set of states that are repeatedly reachable in the same period asw (i.e., R(w) = {w ∈ W : {w,w} ⊂ W t infinitely often}).
We generalize the cycling idea to the notion that there be a path that allows some distinguished state to be separated from every other state that could ever be reached. Given an outcome path h ≡ (y 1 , y 2 
When the set of states is finite, our next Lemma (proved in the Appendix) shows that separation is equivalent to a simpler and seemingly stronger cycling condition. of signalsȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ m , a collection of states W c , and a statē w ∈ W c such that
Lemma 6 A finite public strategy profile of the public-monitoring game is separating if, and only if, there is a finite sequence
1. σ (w,ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ m ) = w for all w ∈ W c , 2. σ (w,ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ m ) ∈ W c for all w ∈ R(w), 3. ∀w ∈ W c \{w}, ∀i ∃k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, such that d i (σ (w,ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ k ) = d i (σ (w,ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ k ),and
for some i andŵ
Note that part 4 implies that |W c | ≥ 2. We emphasize that each state in the set of states W c cycles under the given finite sequence of signals and every state reachable (infinitely often) in the same period asw is taken into W c by one round of the cycle.
Clearly, a separating profile cannot have bounded recall. Moreover, it is easy to construct PPE that neither have bounded recall nor are separating (Example 6). Nonetheless, we are not aware of any strict PPE of substantive interest that neither have bounded recall nor are separating. The strategy profile for Example 6. In states w A andŵ A , the action A is played, while in w B the action B and in w C , the action C is played.
Example 6
The stage game is given in Figure 6 . In the public-monitoring game, there are two public signals, y and y , with distribution (0 < q < p < 1)
Finally, the public profile is illustrated in Figure 7 . This profile is not separating: Under any path in which y y, y = y or y , appears, all states transit to the same state. If only y appears, only w A andŵ A arise. The definition of separation fails because play is the same at states w A andŵ A . The profile is also not robust: After enough realizations of private signals corresponding to y , beliefs must assign roughly equal probability to w A andŵ A , 19 and so after the first realization of a private signal corresponding to y , B is the only best reply (even if the current state is w C ). This example (like the second forgiving grim trigger of Example 3) illustrates the possibility that beliefs over private states can drift to a stationary distribution when play is identical in different states.
It remains to ensure that, under private monitoring, players may transit to different states. It suffices to assume the following, weaker than full-support, condition: 20 Definition 10 A private monitoring distribution (Ω, π) that is ε-close to a public monitoring distribution (Y, ρ) has essentially full support if for all (y 1 , . . . , y n (Ω, π) ) is a private-monitoring game strongly ε-close under some signalling function f to (ũ * , (Y, ρ)) with (Ω, π) having richness, given f , at least ζ and essentially full support, then the induced private profile is not a Nash equilibrium of the private monitoring game.
Theorem 4 Fix a separating strict finite PPE of a full-support public-monitoring game
It is worth noting that the bound on ε is only a function of the richness of the private monitoring. It is independent of the probability that a disagreement in private states arises. By considering finite state profiles that are separating, not only is the difficulty identified in the Introduction dealt with (as we discuss at the end of the next Section), but we can accommodate arbitrarily small probabilities of disagreement.
Thus, separating strict PPE of public-monitoring games are not robust to the introduction of private monitoring. 21 It, of course, also implies that separating behavior in the privatemonitoring game typically cannot coordinate continuation play in the following sense. Say a profile is ε-strict if all the incentive constraints are satisfied by at least ε. (The result follows immediately from upperhemicontinuity and Theorem 4.) 
Corollary 1 Fix a vector of signaling functions f , f i
. Suppose this profile is separating (when interpreted as a public profile). For all ε > 0, there exists k such that for k > k , this profile is not an ε-strict Nash equilibrium.
Since the equilibrium failure of separating profiles seem to arise after private histories that have low probability, an attractive conjecture is that equilibrium can be restored by appropriately modifying the profile at only the problematic histories. Unfortunately, such a modification appears to require additional modifications to the profile, destroying the connection to the public-monitoring game.
The Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 is by contradiction. So, suppose there exists ζ > 0 such that for all k there exists a private monitoring game (u, (Ω k , π k )) strongly 1/k-close under some f to (ũ * , (Y, ρ)) with (Ω k , π k ) having richness at least ζ , with the induced private profile a Nash equilibrium of the private-monitoring game.
To develop intuition, suppose the space of signals for each player were independent of k, so that Ω k i = Ω i . Then, we can assume π k converges to a limit distribution π ∞ on Ω (by choosing a subsequence if necessary). The behavior of beliefs of player i over the private states of the other players under the limit private monitoring distribution (Ω, π ∞ ) is significantly easier to describe.
i (y)} is common belief under π ∞ . Moreover, if the other players start in the same state (such asw) then they stay in the same state thereafter. We can thus initially focus on finding the appropriate sequence of signals to manipulate i's updating about the current private states of the other players, without being concerned about the possibility that subsequent realizations will derail the process (we will deal with that issue subsequently). The difficulty, of course, is that Ω k i depends on k, and moreover, that in principle as k gets large, so may Ω k i . We can however, proceed as follows: For each k and a i ∈ A i , let
i is associated with some public signal, and so we can partition Ω 
and
Without loss of generality, we can assume (2) holds with equality (simply include any signal 
: f i (ω i ) = y may be empty). For each a ∈ A, denote bŷ π k ( · |a) the probability distribution on ∏ i Ω ∞ i induced by π k ( · |a). Note that we now have a sequence of probability distributions {π k (·|a)} k for each a ∈ A on a common finite signal space
By passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume π k (ω|a) k is a convergent sequence with limit π ∞ (ω|a) for all a ∈ A, ω ∈ ∏ i Ω ∞ i . Note that (Ω ∞ , π ∞ ) is 0-close to (Y, ρ). Moreover, by passing to a further subsequence if necessary, we can also assume that, for each i, a i ∈ A i , and y ∈ Y , the convex hull of the set of vectors {γ ∞ a (ω i ) :
In the following lemma, a private signal ω j for player j is consistent with the private signal ω i for player i if f j (ω j ) = f i (ω i ), where f i and f j are the signaling functions from Definition 4. It is an implication of this lemma that if player i assigns strictly positive probability to all the other players being in the statew, then after sufficient repetitions of the cycle ω L i (defined in Lemma 7), player i eventually assigns probability arbitrarily close to 1 that at the end of a cycle, all the other players are in the statew. 
Lemma 7
where Pr ∞ denotes probabilities calculated under π ∞ and the assumption that all players follow the private profile.
Proof. The cycleȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ m from Lemma 6 induces a cycle in the statesw =w 1 , . . . ,w m+1 =w 1 andŵ =ŵ 1 , . . . ,ŵ m+1 =ŵ. We index the cycle by and writeā
. Richness implies that for each , there exists a vector of nonnegative integers, 
For w =w1, then in each period at least one player is in a private state different fromw. From Lemma 6.2,ǎ −i =ã −i for at least one , and so A( h L i ; w) must be strictly less than 1.
We are, of course, primarily concerned with private monitoring under the distribution (Ω k , π k ). In this situation, one must deal with the possibility that player j's private signals may be inconsistent with player i's observations. However, by choosing k sufficiently large, one can ensure that this possibility does not arise with large probability along the cycle ω L i . The subsequent lemma implies that this possibility never arises with large probability. 
Lemma 8 Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 7, and let h t i be a private history for player i satisfyingŵ
where the inequality arises because a player j = i may be in a private state not in W c . Now,
where ξ is to be determined),
Moreover,
we have,
From Lemma 7,
and so there is an ξ > 0 sufficiently small so that (recall that the denominator has a strictly positive limit)
The finiteness of the state space and the number of players allows us to interchange the max and lim operations. Consequently, there exists k such that for all k ≥ k ,
Since
Consequently (7), with (6), implies (5) (since ξ < ξ ).
Lemma 6 guarantees that one round of the cycle of signals will always take a state not in W c into W c , ensuring that the probability on states in W \W c can be controlled.
Lemma 9 Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 7, and let h t i be a private history for player i satisfyingŵ = σ i (h t i ). Fix η > 0 and let ξ and k be the constants identified in Lemma 8 . There exists T such that if t ≥ T , then for all k > k ,
Proof. Fix T large enough, so that ifw ∈ W t (the set of states reachable in period t) for t ≥ T , then W t ⊂ R(w) . Separation then implies Pr k (w
, y −i ) = 0, and so
which is less than ξ for k ≥ k .
We are now in a position to complete the proof. Supposeĥ t i is a private history for player i that leads to the private stateŵ with t ≥ T , and let η be the constant required by Theorem 3. Sinceŵ andw are both reachable in the same period, with positive probability player i observes a private historyĥ t i that leads to the private stateŵ. Moreover, atĥ t i his posterior beliefs that all the other players are in the private statew, Pr k (w t −i =w1|ĥ t i ), is strictly positive for all k, though converging to 0 as k → ∞ (where Pr k denotes probabilities under π k ). If
, Theorem 3 yields the desired conclusion.
Suppose then that Pr k (w t −i =w1|ĥ t i ) > η, and k > k , where k is from Lemma 8. Lemmas 8 and 9 immediately imply that, as long as Pr k (w
after the first cycle, the odds ratio falls until eventually, Pr k (w t −i =w1|h t i ) ≤ η, at which point we are in the first case (sinceŵ cycles under ω L i , i's private state continually returns toŵ). We conclude by explaining how the difficulty identified in the Introduction is dealt with. In the above argument, the length of the cycle was determined by Lemma 7 from the limit distribution (Ω ∞ , π ∞ ), independently of Pr k (w t −i =w1|ĥ t i ). Separation is critical here, since it allows us to focus on a cycle, rather than an entire outcome path. We then considered private-monitoring games sufficiently far out in the sequence, such that along the cycle, state transitions occur as expected with high probability (Lemmas 8 and 9). Since we can use a cycle to manipulate beliefs, the magnitude of the prior is irrelevant; all we need is that Pr k (w t −i =w1|ĥ t i ) > 0.
A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.
where the first inequality follows from ∑ y π ( {ω : f i (ω i ) = y for each i}| a) > 1 − ε |Y | (an implication of part 1 of Definition 4), the second equality follows from |ũ * i (y, 
Then, for all w, w ∈ W reachable in the same period and for all h ∈ Y ∞ ,
Suppose now the profile s has bounded recall. Let (W, w 1 , σ , d) be a representation of s. Suppose w and w are two states reachable in the same period. Then there exists h τ andĥ τ such that w = σ (w 1 , h τ ) and w = σ (w 1 ,ĥ τ ). Then, for all h ∈ Y ∞ , (h τ , h t ) and (ĥ τ , h t ) agree for the last t − 1 periods, and so if t ≥ L + 1, they agree for at least the last L periods, and so
Minimality of the representing automaton then implies that for all
Proof of Theorem 3. Let φ i (w) be player i's continuation value from the strategy profile (W, w, σ , d) in the game with public monitoring (i.e., φ i (w) is the continuation value of state w under the profile W, w 1 , σ , d ), and let φ i (s i |w) be the continuation value to player i from following the strategy s i when all the other players follow the strategy profile (W, w, σ , d). Since the public profile is a strict equilibrium and |W | < ∞, there exists θ > 0 such that for all i, w ∈ W , ands i , a deviation continuation strategy for player i withs 1 i = d i (w), φ i (s i |w) < φ i (w) − θ .
Every strategys i in the game with public monitoring induces a strategy s i in the games with private monitoring that are strongly ε-close in the natural manner: Denote by V π i (w) the expected value to player i in the game with private monitoring (u * , (Ω, π)) from the private profile induced by (W, w, σ , d) Proof of Lemma 6. It is immediate that if the profile satisfies the conditions in the lemma, then it is separating. Suppose, then, that the profile is separating. Given the outcome path h ∈ Y ∞ and statew from the definition of separation, σ (w, h t ) denotes the state reached after the first t − 1 signals in h from the state w.
The idea is to construct the set W c by iteratively adding the states necessary to satisfy parts 1 and 2; parts 3 and 4 will then be implications of separation. We start by considering all states reached infinitely often from states in R(w) along h. While this implies a cycle of those states, there is no guarantee that other states reachable in the same period will be mapped into the cycle. Accordingly, we include states that are reached infinitely often from states that are reachable under any history in the same period as the states just identified, and so on. Proceeding in this way, we will construct a set of states and a finite sequence of signals with the properties that the states cycle under the sequence, and every state that could arise is mapped under the finite sequence of signals to a cycling state. We begin by denoting by w 1 (t) the vector of states (σ (w, h t )) w∈R(w) ∈ W R(w) . Since W is finite, so is W R(w) , and there exists T 1 1 such that for all τ ≥ T 1 1 , w 1 (τ) appears infinitely often in the sequence {w 1 (t)} t . Let W 1 ≡ σ (w, h T 1 1 ) : w ∈ R(w) , i.e., W 1 is the collection of states that can be reached in period T 1 1 under h, starting from any state in R(w). and settingw = σ (w, h T 1 κ ) yields parts 1 and 2 of the Lemma. Separation implies that under h, for any state w ∈ R(w)\{w} and for all players i, there is some state reached infinitely often from w under h at which i plays differently from the state reached in that period fromw. The dates T 1 κ and T 2 κ have been chosen so that any state reached infinitely often under h from a state w ∈ R(w) appears at least once between T 1 κ and T 2 κ on the path starting in period T 1 κ from the state σ (w, h T 1 κ ). Consequently, we have part 3. Finally, since W 1 ≥ 2, |W c | ≥ 2. If part 4 does not hold for the current choice of cycle and states, by part 3, it will hold in some period of the cycle (ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ m ) , say period . Part 4 then holds as well for the cycle beginning in period , (ȳ , . . . ,ȳ m ,ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ −1 ), the statew = σ (w, h T 1 κ ,ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ −1 ), and the set of cycling states is given by {σ (w,ȳ 1 , . . . ,ȳ −1 ) : w ∈ W c }.
